CHAPTER 15 A Look around at What Lies Ahead: Prediction and Predictability in Language Processing
Marta Kutas , Katherine A. DeLong , and Nathaniel J. Smith Traditionally, prediction has been considered an ineffi cient and cognitively expensive processing mechanism in the domain of language comprehension, where there are many possible ways for relaying a single thought, meaning or desire and the chances of mispredicting are accordingly high. Predictive linguistic processing, however, does not seem untenable given its similarity to other neural processing domains that are contextually grounded and appear to implement knowledge-and experience-based mental representations anticipatorily. Here, we examine linguistic prediction from multiple perspectives, ranging from theoretical models that analyze predictability at the level of ambiguity resolution, to experimental evidence primarily from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that supports a "strong" model of prediction in which items are not just incrementally integrated, but are wholly or featurally pre-activated via accruing mental sentential representations. We also explore possible consequences of a neural language parser (aka, brain) that may be prone to mispredicting, and what electrophysiological evidence for such processing may look like. We conclude by arguing for the importance of investigating such linguistic eff ects as yet another example of a neural system in which probability estimation is inherent, with a proposal to move beyond the debate of whether there is linguistic prediction, toward focusing research eff orts on how pre-activation may occur and what is pre-activated.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF LINGUISTIC

PREDICTION
Within a variety of neural domains, perhaps including some described in other chapters of this volume, the understanding of how predictive processing benefi ts a system may be relatively straightforward. With the study of language processing, however, such benefi ts could be various and perhaps not immediately clear. Linguistic comprehension requires processing a noisy sensory input to recognize complex structures (e.g., phonemes, syllables, words, syntax) and integrating these structures with physical and social contexts, with general/world knowledge, and with each other, to construct meaning. Amazingly, this whole process occurs over mere hundreds of milliseconds. As such, there are a number of ways that linguistic comprehension could be facilitated by predicting upcoming material.
Given the time constraints under which comprehension operates, one clear benefi t of being able to predict upcoming material is that it may allow a listener or reader to produce an overt response more quickly, without waiting for the material itself to become available. For instance, Marslen-Wilson ( 1973 ) argued that experimental participants performing verbal shadowing (i.e., listening to a stream of speech and simultaneously repeating it aloud) were -given the form of the shadowers' speech errors in which they supplied structurally appropriate, semantically and syntactically congruent continuationsusing predictions about upcoming speech to achieve faster response latencies. Similarly, Sacks, Schegloff , and Jeff erson ( 1974 ) observed that during ordinary dialogue, one interlocutor commonly begins to talk precisely at the moment that the previous speaker fi nishes, and they argued that listeners must be predicting the timing of such "transition-relevance places" to properly time their own responses.
Another potential benefi t to linguistic prediction relates to a challenge faced by the linguistic processor: Th e appropriate interpretation of the current input oft en depends on future input. Consider the classic "garden-path" sentence, " Th e horse raced past the barn fell " (Bever, 1970 ) . When the processor has encountered only part of this sentence -" Th e horse raced past … " -then it is ambiguous whether raced is the sentence's main verb (referring to what the horse did), or the beginning of a relative clause (describing the horse). In principle, the language processor should therefore wait until the end of the sentence to interpret raced . Only when it reaches fell would it discover that the relative clause reading (" Th e horse, (that was) raced past the barn, fell ") is correct, but by this point, most people have already committed to a main verb reading and thus are at least briefl y stymied. Th is early commitment can be seen as a prediction about the form of the remainder of the sentence, and the confusion the result of an inaccurate prediction. But gardenpath sentences are relatively rare in real life, and when this early prediction is accurate, it should allow substantial benefi ts in speed of processing, reduced memory load, and so forth. In this sense, any language processor that proceeds incrementally, without waiting for the end of each utterance before beginning its work, could be seen as inherently predictive. However, this does not mean that such a processor is forming explicit expectations about upcoming material. Many classic models of such eff ects instead rely on various bottom-up heuristics that -as a kind of happy coincidence, from the processor's point of view -oft en result in choices that later turn out to have been correct (e.g., Frazier & Fodor, 1978 ) .
Th e diffi culties caused by garden-path sentences can also be seen as a special case of a more general problem in language comprehension: the problem of ambiguity. In addition to the temporary ambiguity created by temporal sequencing, there is ambiguity created by (at least) sensory noise ( letter and ladder may be acoustically indistinguishable in a noisy room, or compare " wreck a nice " and recognize ), lexical items with multiple senses ( palms , the tree versus the body part), and syntactic ambiguity (" I saw the girl in the park with the telescope " -who had the telescope?). Just as comprehenders might resolve temporary ambiguities by predicting upcoming input, they may resolve these more durable ambiguities by "predicting" the speaker's intent. While such cases are, on a surface level, quite diff erent from prediction as it is usually understood, these two kinds of ambiguity resolution are unifi ed in probabilistic models of language comprehension, where both reduce to the problem of picking the most likely interpretation (Jurafsky, 1996 ) .
A fi nal possible role for prediction in language is that, by forming explicit predictions of upcoming material, the parser may not only ease the processing of current material (as described earlier), but get a head start on future material, leading to increased effi ciency if this anticipatory processing turns out to be accurate (though it undoubtedly will not always be). Broadly construed, then, this "strongly" predictive view of language comprehension posits that comprehenders utilize a variety of sources of constraint as they become available to pre-activate upcoming items and/or their features, with aspects of linguistic input being processed both incrementally and in parallel. Th is type of presumably rapid, online pre-activation that most likely does not reach the level of consciousness has (until recently) been diffi cult to tap into experimentally, and thus, it has historically also been the most controversial.
HISTORICAL OPPOSITION TO PREDICTIVE LANGUAGE PROCESSING
Despite general considerations about biological continuity, informal intuitions stemming from our experiences "taking the words out of " a speaker's mouth, and evidence from specialized (Stanovich & West, 1979 ) .
Results from controlled experiments seem to support this proposal: When participants are asked to continue a phrase or complete a sentence, their responses routinely converge on the same word when contextual constraint is strong but show greater variance under weak constraints (e.g., Bloom & Fischler, 1980 ; Schwanenfl ugel, 1986 ) . In off -line language tasks, then, it is widely acknowledged that with suffi cient time individuals do use sentential context to select the most probable linguistic completions. Most language, however, is not so highly constrained. In either case, there is a question as to whether this more deliberate, conscious (post-lexical) offl ine strategy translates to the rapid, less conscious processing that seems to characterize real-time language comprehension. Or is the real-time use of contextual constraint of a qualitatively diff erent nature? Indeed, a major outstanding question in the sentence processing literature has been whether information about particular words or their features gets pre-activated during on-line sentence processing as a result of top-down contextual processing, or whether word processing is stimulus driven (bottom up), triggered by the input, that is, initiated only aft er the physical stimulus has been received. Perhaps surprisingly to some, there is no clear consensus. In fact, most theories of sentence processing have not addressed this issue directly, even though some stance about linguistic prediction is oft en implicit.
Why the paucity of research on this question? As already mentioned, natural language is not considered to be very constraining, certainly not constraining enough for a predictive system to be accurate a majority of the time. In principle, such errors should result in processing costs, but such costs have rarely been evidenced (Gough, Alford, & Holley-Wilcox, 1981 ) . Even those who grant some word-level prediction from sentential context argue that word recognition can only benefi t from context under special circumstances such as when the target input is degraded, when targets are temporally off set with respect to the context (allowing time for prediction), or when readers are unskilled, and thus slow (Mitchell, 1982 ) . Furthermore, the ecological validity of the paradigms from which much of the existing evidence for prediction comes has been questioned. Rayner, Ashby, Pollatsek, and Reichle ( 2004 ) , for example, point to the typically nonnaturalistic stimulus presentation rates (e.g., artifi cial timing of sentences or context-target word delays), which they believe provide readers with ample time to form conscious predictions, and thus bear little resemblance to natural language. We suggest that a more insidious (and perhaps unconscious) component to anti-prediction biases in language research may have to do with the long history of modular views of language processing (e.g., Fodor, 1983 ; Forster, 1979 ) and their inherently bottom-up emphasis. On the view that language comprehension is a contextinvariant, data-driven process, with information from one neural domain unlikely to preemptively infl uence processing in another, anticipation of upcoming input based on contextual cues would seem untenable. In sum, some combination of these reasons, among others, has likely contributed to the general lack of exploration of anticipatory comprehension in language historically.
Fortunately, the tides are changing, and in the following sections we review evidence demonstrating that both incremental processing and estimation of linguistic probabilities are pervasive. Building on this work, we then present recent results which argue that the language processor implements even the "strong form" of prediction, regularly pre-activating material in an anticipatory fashion. In this discussion, we provide some evidence for how such anticipatory 
FROM BUFFERING TO INCREMENTALITY
Early models of sentence processing included some form of memory buff er by which sentential elements were temporarily stored for later integration at phrasal, clausal, or sentence boundaries (Abney, 1989 ; Carroll & Bever, 1978 ; Daneman & Carpenter, 1983 ; Just & Carpenter, 1980 ; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978 ; Mitchell & Green, 1978 ; Pritchett, 1991 ) . Eventually, such delayed processing models became diffi cult to reconcile with accumulating evidence for context updating on a word-by-word basis. Notions of buff ering gradually gave way to the more widely held view that words are incorporated successively into the sentential context as they are received and identifi ed, with gradual accretion of meaning in the mind of the comprehender -a more incremental view (e.g., Altmann & Steedman, 1988 ; Boland, Tanenhaus, Garnsey, & Carlson, 1995 ; Kutas & Hillyard, 1983 ; Marslen-Wilson, 1975 ; Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980 ; Pickering, 1994 ; Steedman, 1989 ; Traxler, Bybee, & Pickering, 1997 ; Tyler & Marslen-Wilson, 1977 ) . Th e view that language comprehension is largely incremental is rooted in evidence from a wide variety of studies with diff erent methodologies, including off -line and on-line techniques. For instance, Boland et al. ( 1995 ) asked readers to indicate via a button press when a sentence stopped making sense. Presented with identically structured " wh "-questions such as " Which military base did Hank deliver the machine guns to __ last week? " vs. " Which preschool did Hank deliver the machine guns to__ last week? " participants pushed the button at machine guns in the preschool version but not in the military base version. Th ese results indicate that the thematic role of the questioned element ( military base/preschool ), displaced from its location in a declarative sentence (e.g., Hank delivered the machine guns to which military base/preschool ), is assigned as soon as the verb ( deliver ) is encountered, rather than buff ered for interpretation at sentence end; in other words, it is processed incrementally. Using a diff erent behavioral method, Marslen-Wilson ( 1975 ) showed that so-called fast shadowers -individuals that repeated backrecorded speech with very little delay (sometimes as short as 250 ms) -corrected pronunciation errors in the recorded speech signal, indicating that they were processing the shadowed text at a semantic level, as it was received.
Th ough clear evidence for incrementality has emerged from such behavioral work, the strongest evidence to date comes from investigations of real-time language processing using techniques like eye-tracking and event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that (a) do not require additional tasks (e.g., button presses or spoken responses) other than listening or reading, and (b) are able to continuously track sentence processing with high temporal resolution throughout the course of a sentence, thereby making it easier to isolate the precise processing stage implicated. In eye-tracking studies, for instance, the timelocked characteristics of eye movements provide information about the processes that underlie spoken language comprehension. In the visual world paradigm, for example, individuals' eye movements are monitored as they look at a visual scene while simultaneously listening to a sentence or set of instructions that refers to objects in that scene . Many such studies have found that participants make saccadic eye movements to depicted objects without delay upon hearing the relevant input (oft en prior to the referent word itself), supporting models of word-by-word integration (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998 ; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999 ; Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 2002 ) .
Similarly, ERPs -scalp recordings of the synaptic potentials generated primarily by synchronously fi ring multiple pyramidal cells in the neocortex -also aff ord a continuous but time-stamped look at ongoing neural activity during written and spoken language processing. Kutas and Hillyard ( 1980 ) , for example, showed that a semantically anomalous word within a certain context elicits an enhanced ERP component known as the N400 at the point at which it is encountered -indeed, within 200 ms of the word's onset -relative to a semantically congruent continuation in the same context. Th e N400, as a neural response to any potentially meaningful item, has sometimes been considered to index semantic fi t of an item in a particular context, and as such, provides additional evidence for context updating before the end of an utterance. Th us, these and other studies (e.g., van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999 ; van Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, & Nieuwland, 2007 ; van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & Brown, 2003 ; Van Petten & Kutas, 1990 ) indicate that sentence processing is incremental.
ANTICIPATORY LANGUAGE PROCESSING
In the past decade or so, however, there has been a wave of both empirical and modeling work suggesting that language processing may not just be incremental; instead, evidence from various sources has supported the view that sentential constraint begins to exert its infl uence before words have been uniquely identifi ed. We might even consider this somewhat of a "revival, " since a few early language processing models argued specifi cally for more anticipatory processing in which available contextual factors are used to activate words in advance of receiving them (McClelland & Elman, 1986 ; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981 ) . More recent investigations of anticipatory processing have been spurred, in part, by interest in questions of how generalized prediction might be, what it might be used for, what information is available to predictive processing, and what aspects of upcoming input are being predicted. Eye-tracking methods, for instance, have successfully employed the visual world paradigm to detect preferential looks to visual targets before complete auditory information is available. As an example, Eberhard et al. ( 1995 ) found that when participants were given an instruction " Pick up the candle , " they not only immediately initiated a saccade to an actual candle in front of them, but did so before the second syllable of candle had been fully articulated. Furthermore, this predictive process was sensitive to visual context; when the same instruction was given to participants whose work area contained both a candle and candy, so that the fi rst syllable canwas no longer suffi cient to identify the reference, the average saccade initiation occurred only aft er the disambiguating second syllable was spoken.
Other visual world studies have demonstrated looks to candidate entities that entirely preceded the relevant input (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999 ; Kamide, 2008 ; Kamide, Scheepers & Altmann, 2003 ; Kamide, Scheepers, Altmann, & Crocker, 2002 ; Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers, & Pickering, 2005 ; Sussman & Sedivy, 2003 ) . For instance, upon hearing a sentence fragment such as " Th e girl will ride the … " while viewing a scene depicting a man, a girl, a motorcycle, and a carousel, comprehenders looked toward the depiction of the carousel during the verb ride ; conversely, upon hearing " Th e man will ride the … , " they looked toward the motorcycle during the verb ride (Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003 ) . Based on such research, we can conclude that the language parser is capable of combining visual context with noun/verb semantics to quickly narrow the possibilities for upcoming input.
Studies like these demonstrate one approach to examining prediction, although it might be argued that this is prediction in a very restricted sense (where candidates for upcoming input are limited, visually present, and highly constrained). We therefore turn our attention to studies using written stimuli, which -while forgoing the visual world paradigm's naturalistic environmentallow the examination of a broad range of linguistic structures beyond concrete referential phrases.
EFFECTS OF PREDICTABILITY
In our discussion so far, we have been careful to use the word prediction only for cases in which upcoming, unseen input in some way alters current processing. Th ere is also, however, a substantial literature on the eff ects of "predictability" on linguistic processing. Th e basic intuition here is that some words could be predicted in advance from context; and even if the brain does not make this predict ion in advance, once the word is encountered it might still be processed diff erently depending on its predict ability -how well it could have been predicted from context. Obviously, if the brain does make an explicit prediction in advance, then that may well alter its processing in a way that later creates predictability eff ects; but other mechanisms that do not involve prediction per se are also possible, and several have been proposed. In this section we briefl y review theoretical and experimental evidence for predictability eff ects, as well as the potential mechanisms underlying them.
In the context of language, the most compelling theoretical reason for the brain to compute predictabilities is, as mentioned earlier, for use in disambiguation. Ambiguities of various sorts are pervasive in language, and resolving them requires combining evidence from semantic, syntactic, and other sources; experiments show that comprehenders are able to quickly bring all of these to bear (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004 ; MacDonald, 1993 ; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994 ; McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998 ; Spivey et al., 2002 ; Tanenhaus et al., 1995 ; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994 ) . Th is requires a common mechanism for evidence combination across diff erent parts of the linguistic processing system, and probability theory (with Bayes' rule) is a natural, even optimal, fi t (Jurafsky, 1996 ) . In general, the system must presumably be fl exible about what probabilities it can compute; picking the most likely sense of a word has diff erent requirements from, for instance, picking the most likely parse of a sentence. For our discussion of prediction, the most relevant computation would be of the probabilities of current or upcoming individual words. But are these among the probabilities that the brain computes? Arguably, yes. Work on automatic speech recognition has shown that such single-word probabilities are exactly what are needed to accurately decode the noisy (thus ambiguous) acoustic speech signal.
Furthermore, experimental evidence shows that the processor is sensitive to such single-word probabilities. In ERP studies, the N400 component to semantically congruous words shows a graded sensitivity to those words' predictability in context (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984 ) , while the P600 component responds diff erentially to highversus low-likelihood syntactic forms (even when those forms are all acceptable; Hsu, 2009 ; Kaan, Harris, Gibson, & Holcomb, 2000 ; Osterhout, Holcomb, & Swinney, 1994 ) , and even earlier eff ects of context on lexical access may be present as well (Sereno, Brewer, & O'Donnell, 2003 ) . Such eff ects could potentially be glimpses of diff erent aspects of the system described earlier at work. We return to the question of whether the N400's sensitivity to predict ability is truly predict ive in a later section.
Reading time studies are another source of evidence that the brain is sensitive to predictability. Less predictable words -those with lower probability given context -are read more slowly (Ehrlich & Rayner, 1981 ) . Th is eff ect is sensitive to both semantic (Bicknell, Elman, Hare, McRae, & Kutas, 2008 ; Duff y, Henderson, & Morris, 1989 ; Garnsey, Pearlmutter, Myers, & Lotocky, 1997 ; Hare, McRae, & Elman, 2003 ; Morris, 1994 ) and syntactic (Levy, 2008 ; Staub & Clift on, 2006 ; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Kello, 1993 ) manipulations of predictability, and its underlying cause is not yet clear. For instance, Norris ( 2006 ) suggests that the reading time eff ect may arise in the sensory system, as a side eff ect of decoding noisy visual input. Th e idea is that to recognize words that have less top-down support (relative to their visual competitors), the brain must acquire more bottom-up sensory evidence before it can reach an acceptable level of certainty that the word has been correctly identifi ed, and gathering more evidence requires looking longer. Levy ( 2008 ) , on the other hand, proposes that the reading time eff ect arises because as each word is processed, each potential whole-sentence interpretation has some shift in likelihood, becoming more or less supported by the available data. If there is a cost to shift ing the internal representation of these likelihoods, as measured in reading time, then words which cause a greater total likelihood shift will take longer to read. Finally, he shows mathematically that the size of this shift (measured in KL divergence; Kullback & Leibler, 1951 ) is determined by the word's predictability. Th ese two theories are nonpredictive accounts of predictability eff ects: All of the aff ected processing takes place aft er the word itself is seen.
Another approach is to model the linguistic processor as maintaining a sorted, limited size list of candidate whole-sentence parses; then, increased reading time may occur either when it turns out that the appropriate parse was pruned from the list for having too low probability (Jurafsky, 1996 ; Narayanan & Jurafsky, 1998 ) , or when new evidence turns a less preferred parse into the most likely possibility, triggering a shift in attention (Crocker & Brants, 2000 ; Narayanan & Jurafsky, 2002 ) . Such models are weakly predictive in the sense that they explicitly marginalize over potential continuations to determine which parses are most likely and which can be pruned to reduce memory load. However, pruning can only explain eff ects in somewhat special cases (i.e., garden-path sentences), while attention shift s only occur at some relatively special points in a sentence. Smith and Levy ( 2008 ) , however, demonstrate predictability eff ects on reading time at arbitrary points in naturalistic text, and they argue that sensory factors (as per Norris) cannot explain all variations in processing time (Rayner, Liversedge, White, & Vergilino-Perez, 2003 ) . Th ey propose instead a motor control-inspired model of "optimal preparation, " in which the processor does a graded amount of anticipatory processing for each potential continuation; the actual amount of processing is determined as a trade-off between the resources spent on this anticipatory processing (preparing to process a word quickly is costly) versus the increased processing efficiency achieved if this continuation is actually encountered (sometimes preparation is worth it). Such a model naturally expends more eff ort on preparing for those continuations which are more likely to be encountered, thus explaining the predictability eff ect on subsequent reading time of the continuation. By our classifi cations, this is a strongly predictive model, but one with little direct evidence to support it -we cannot observe this postulated anticipatory processing directly via behavioral measures. We therefore turn to discussion of recent electrophysiological work that bears on this question.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL EVIDENCE FOR A "STRONG" FORM OF PREDICTION
As should be evident from the previous sections, linguistic prediction and predictability can be identifi ed in a variety of ways. We will now present evidence for the "strong" form of prediction -that is, experimental evidence showing that specifi c linguistic items or their features are pre-activated at some time point prior to encountering the confi rmatory bottom-up input. Such evidence turns out to be somewhat tricky to obtain, due to the challenge of identifying processing related to an item that has not yet occurred. In particular, one diffi culty centers on the prediction/integration debate -in other words, the challenge of distinguishing facilitation eff ects at a target word as being due to that word being predicted versus it being simply easier to integrate upon receipt. A case in point is the N400 ERP component. N400 amplitude is sensitive to a variety of factors -including word frequency, repetition, concreteness, and orthographic neighborhood size, among others -and is especially large to nouns that do not semantically fi t with their preceding context (e.g., the word dog in " I take my coff ee with cream and dog "; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980 ) . N400s are also evident in responses to all but the most highly expected of nouns, even when they do fi t with a prior sentence context. However, despite the sensitivity of the N400 to offl ine semantic expectancy, it is impossible to determine whether variation in N400 amplitude to the eliciting word during online sentence processing means that readers are using context to generate expectancies for that upcoming item ( prediction view) or whether they are forced by the word itself to devote more or fewer resources to integrating the word into the existing sentence representation ( integration view). Clearly, an argument for information getting pre-activated would be strengthened if it could be demonstrated that predictions were being formulated prior to target words.
In one of the earlier ERP studies to argue for predictive language comprehension, Federmeier and Kutas ( 1999a ) found that in highly constraining contexts (e.g., " He caught the pass and scored another touchdown. Th ere was nothing he OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 28/10/2010, GLYPH enjoyed more than a good game of … "), unexpected and implausible target nouns (e.g., baseball ) that were categorically related to the contextually expected target endings (e.g., football ) were processed more similarly at a semantic level (as refl ected in N400 amplitudes) to the expected endings than they were to categorically unrelated unexpected nouns (e.g., monopoly ). Baseball and monopoly are equally implausible endings in this context, and yet the brain response to these two endings in the N400 region (200-500 ms post-target onset) is diff erent. Critically, this facilitation decreases as sentential constraint becomes weaker even as the plausibility of these categorically related anomalies increases, for example, " Eleanor wanted to fi x her visitor some coff ee. Th en she realized she did not have a clean cup/bowl/fork. " Why might the within category violation ( baseball ) behave like a more plausible ending, eliciting a brain response closer to the expected ending? Federmeier and Kutas argue that it is because the language processing system is predicting in the strong sense; in other words, pre-activating perceptual-conceptual features of the expected ending, which is more likely to share these features with the within category violation ( baseball ) than the between category one ( monopoly ). Th us, while norming shows that these words are equally incongruous with the linguistic context, baseball is more congruous with the brain's predictions. Importantly, similar results obtain whether the sentences were read one word at a time at relatively slow rates or presented as natural speech (Federmeier, Mclennan, De Ochoa, & Kutas, 2002 ) . Van Petten, Coulson, Plante, Rubin, and Parks ( 1999 ) also found N400-based evidence for prediction during naturalistic speech processing in a study designed to determine whether semantic integration processes began before or only aft er complete identifi cation of a spoken word. To that end, participants listened to sentences (e.g., " It was a pleasant surprise to fi nd that the car repair bill was only seventeen … ") that were completed by a highly constrained, expected, congruous completion ( dollars ), a semantically incongruous word that began with the same initial sound (phonemic similarity) as the expected congruous completion ( dolphins ), and a semantically incongruous word ( scholars ) that ended with the same fi nal sound and thus rhymed with the expected congruous completion. Th e critical contrast is between the N400s elicited by the two incongruous endings, which are equally nonsensical in the sentence context. Although equivalent in amplitude, the N400s diff ered in their latencies, with the N400 to the incongruous rhyming endings ( scholars ) diverging much earlier from the relative positivity to the congruous ending ( dollars ) than the incongruous ending with an overlapping initial sound ( dolphins ). Moreover, the eff ect of context preceded a word's isolation point -that is, before suffi cient acoustic information had accrued to determine the word's identity (by about 200 ms). Th is demonstrates that not only do listeners use context to disambiguate partial auditory input -confi rming the visual world results described earlier -but, in addition, their N400 response to incongruity begins when they detect the deviation from the expected word, potentially before the incongruous word could be identifi ed.
Results from these studies are diffi cult to reconcile with a purely integrative model of comprehension, implicating some form of neural pre-activation instead. In all these cases, however, the observed ERP eff ects were evident at the target words of interest, leaving them at least superfi cially open to the "oh, it's just integration" criticism. Perhaps more compelling evidence of pre-activation comes from designs in which the electrophysiological sign of prediction precedes the target word that was presumably being predicted. For instance, work by Wicha and colleagues (Wicha, Bates, Moreno, & Kutas, 2003 ; Wicha, Moreno, & Kutas, 2004 ) investigated linguistic expectation in a series of studies with Spanish sentences by focusing on ERPs to gender-marked articles preceding target nouns of particular gender classes. In separate experiments, native Spanish speakers either listened to or read moderately to highly constraining sentences that contained a gender-marked article followed by either a written word or an embedded line drawing. Th e word or line drawing target was either the expected (highly probable) continuation or a semantically incongruent continuation of the [common] . " Th e gender-marked infl ectional suffi xes on the target adjectives were either congruent with the gender of the highly expected target noun or were not, being instead of the opposite gender category and then followed by a less expected but still semantically congruent noun. In contrast to the Wicha studies, they did not include any gender mismatches between adjectives and their upcoming nouns. Within high constraint contexts, there was a diff erential ERP eff ect for adjectives with versus without the expected gender, which emerged at the point the predicted and unpredicted infl ectional suffi xes of the adjectives fi rst diverged from each other (e.g., the Dutch word for "big" marked with neuter gender is groot vs. with common gender grote ; the ERP eff ect began when their pronunciations begin to diverge). Th ey concluded that the ERP eff ect at the gender-marked adjectives was primarily a syntactic one, and as this study and other work by their group (e.g., Otten & van Berkum, 2008 , 2009 attest, comprehenders do indeed use sentence context to form predictions.
DeLong, Urbach, and Kutas ( 2005 ) employed a logically similar experimental design in English to test for prediction of yet another feature of language. Th eir design took advantage of a phonological feature of the English language in which diff erent indefi nite articles, a and an , are used depending on the initial phoneme of the immediately following word. Devoid of gender, case marking, and specifi c semantic content, English indefi nite articles off er a means for exploring linguistic prediction at the level of phonological word forms. Participants read sentences that ranged in constraint and were continued by a range of more or less expected indefi nite article/noun pairings; for example, " Th e day was breezy so the boy went outside to fl y … a kite/an airplane … in the park " in which a kite is highly expected and an airplane , although plausible, is less so. Th e primary focus, as in the Wicha et al. and van Berkum et al. studies, was not on the nouns but on the prenominal words -in this case, the articles. As expected based on the literature, there was a signifi cant inverse correlation between N400 amplitudes in the ERPs to the target nouns ( kite/airplane ) and their offl ine cloze probabilities (with cloze defi ned as the percentage of respondents supplying a particular continuation for a context in an offl ine norming task; Taylor, 1953 ) : the higher a word's cloze probability, the smaller its N400 amplitude. Th is correlation, however, is equally consistent with theoretical accounts based on integration diffi culty or prediction. Th e same pattern of reliable inverse correlations in the N400 region of the ERP to the articles, however, is less theoretically accommodating. Although the article correlations were slightly lower (maximal r -values in high -.60's to low -.70's at posterior electrode sites), they could only be explained by a predictive account. Otherwise, would the brain respond diff erentially to a versus an ? Certainly, they mean the same thing, and they are in principle equally easy to integrate with respect to the ongoing context. What they diff er in is their phonological form and critically what that says about the initial sound of the upcoming noun. We maintain that these correlations demonstrate that readers were anticipating the most likely noun given the prior context (e.g., kite ), and encountering the phonologically wrong article ( an ) for that noun aff ected ongoing sentence processing. Similar to the nouns, the maximum N400 article-cloze correlations were not randomly distributed, but rather were clustered over the posterior regions of the head where N400 eff ects are typically the largest. So over these scalp sites, a large percentage of the variance of brain activity (N400 amplitude) for the indefi nite articles was accounted for by the average probability that individuals would continue the sentence context with that article. In short, these data are clear evidence of prediction in language at a phonological level. Th ese results indicate that people do use sentence context to form graded predications for specifi c upcoming words, and not just in highly constraining contexts. Even in moderately constraining sentence contexts at least one and perhaps multiple items seem to be pre-activated albeit to varying degrees.
Studies of ERPs in written and spoken language, then, have off ered up relatively strong evidence for linguistic prediction at featural and lexical levels. Arguably even more striking fi ndings about linguistic prediction have come from studies in which ERPs are recorded in combination with the visual hemifi eld technique. In the visual hemifi eld technique, target stimuli are presented a few degrees to the right or left of subject's fi xation to expose only the contralateral hemisphere to that stimulus for the fi rst approximately 10 ms (Banich, 2003 ) . Th is mode of presentation provides the receiving hemisphere a brief head start that remarkably results in temporally extended lateralized processing diff erences in the two hemispheres, which by inference has been taken to refl ect the diff erent ways in which the two hemispheres deal with various linguistic factors. In studies of this type, Federmeier and colleagues (e.g., Federmeier, 2007 ; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999b , 2002 found that only with right visual fi eld presentations (when target words were initially presented to the left hemisphere, or LH) did the pattern of ERPs resemble those with central visual presentation; ERP patterns with left visual fi eld presentations (when targets were initially presented to the right hemisphere) resulted in a diff erent ERP pattern. Th ese results thus led them to propose that left hemisphere processing was biased toward semantic feature pre-activation (i.e., prediction) via top-down cues, whereas right hemisphere (RH) processing was characterized by more bottom-up processing in combination with a wait-and-see approach, operating via integration with working memory. Th ese fi ndings dovetail nicely with a longstanding and more general view of the LH functioning as the brain's "interpreter" (sometimes "confabulator"), hypothesizing patterns even when there are none; in contrast, the RH maintains a more veridical record of the world it perceives (Gazzaniga, 1985 ; Metcalfe, Funnell, & Gazzaniga, 1995 ; Wolford, Miller & Gazzaniga, 2000 ) . Th e idea that the LH may respond more to perceived event probabilities (even if the event's occurrence is not immediate), while the RH may be less likely to generalize away from the input (Gazzaniga, 2000 ) , is one that undoubtedly requires more exploration within the domain of linguistic pre-activation. It is of particular relevance if one takes the view that comprehension does not employ a special language processor, but rather is a "new machine built of old parts" (Bates & Goodman, 1997 ) . Taken together, these electrophysiological studies argue for the "strong" form of prediction by implicating a neural language parser that triggers word features (e.g., syntactic, conceptual, semantic) and forms in advance of their input. Th is work demonstrates that linguistic expectancies can emerge from contextual operators on semantic memory as sentential context accrues, in cases where candidate entities (or their depictions) are not physically present to aid the brain in narrowing the possibilities for likely continuations. And most importantly, these experiments are sensitive to the key factor for demonstrating that prediction is a routine part of real-time linguistic processing -that is, the pre-target timing of such eff ects.
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES TO LINGUISTIC PREDICTION
A fl ip side to anticipating upcoming language input is that there could (though according to some models, there needn't!) be some type of processing consequence -or even a landscape of processing consequences -for not encountering highly probable material. A possible example of such an eff ect, Federmeier, Wlotko, De OchoaDewald, and Kutas ( 2007 ) observed a late positive (LP) ERP to low probability congruous sentence endings (relative to high probability ones) that completed highly but not weakly constraining contexts (e.g., " He bought her a pearl necklace for her collection " vs. " He looked worried because he might have broken his collection . ") From these results they argued for a cost -perhaps refl ecting inhibition or revision -upon encountering an unlikely, but plausible, word in a strongly predictive context. Similarly, DeLong, Urbach, and also observed a prolonged, late frontal positivity (500-1200 ms) to unexpected relative to expected nouns (e.g., airplane in " Th e day was breezy so the boy went outside to fl y … a kite/an airplane … "). Moreover, they demonstrated that this graded late positivity to unexpected nouns varied as a function of the strength of expectancy (constraint) for the most predictable items. Taken together, these fi ndings of late positive ERPs to unexpected nouns that increase with the degree of constraint violation strongly support the idea that when highly preactivated input is not received, some form of additional processing may be called for.
In contrast, there has been little behavioral evidence over the years for such sentence processing "costs" in terms of naming/lexical decision time latencies, a detail which has served for some as an important argument against linguistic prediction (e.g., Gough et al., 1981 ) . However, a general problem with studies basing their "no prediction" arguments on "no cost" fi ndings (e.g., a lack of an inhibitory eff ect) relates to the baseline conditions of comparison, that is, the supposedly "neutral" conditions against which the "cost" conditions are contrasted (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1983 ) . Th e diffi culty (if not impossibility) in determining what constitutes an appropriately neutral context, brings into question the weight of such conclusions, and indeed the specifi c binary contrasts typical of such studies may not be the only (or best) way to go about testing for "cost. "
Comprehension theories that have included some type of processing "costs" have mainly posited them in terms of syntactic predictions. For instance, in Gibson's Dependency Locality Th eory (Gibson, 1998 ) grammatical complexity in sentences is modeled in terms of memory and integration costs that arise from predictions generated by previous items, with such costs being a function of the distance between syntactically dependent elements. Additionally, various electrophysiological studies have proposed that at a minimum, the P600 (a late occurring positivegoing ERP component) has an amplitude that increases as various syntactic aspects of sentence processing become more diffi cult (e.g., for syntactic disambiguation, Osterhout & Mobley, 1995 ; syntactic revision, Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992 ; syntactic integration diffi culty, Kaan et al., 2000 ; or syntactic reanalysis, Hagoort, Brown, & Groothusen, 1993 ) . Although "cost" may not be the right way of thinking about this component, it is certainly a diff erent situation than, say, the N400 whose amplitude decreases as contextual facilitation from preceding semantic information increases. Another hint that the P600 might be related to some sort of prediction violation comes from a number of recent studies that have found modulations of this ERP component to more semantic experimental manipulations. Th ese "semantic P600s" have alternately been linked to costs for thematic role assignments (e.g., Hoeks, Stowe, & Doedens, 2004 ) , detections of confl icts between semantic plausibility and syntactic requirements (e.g., Van Herten, Chwilla, & Kolk, 2006 ) , and confl icting processing streams, including syntax versus semantics (e.g., Kuperberg, 2007 ) . Th ough none of these lines of research directly implicates violation of general linguistic prediction as the possible source of such ERP patterns, an intriguing possibility is that these eff ects could potentially be related to those observed in the Federmeier et al. ( 2007 ) and DeLong et al. ( 2007 ) studies described earlier -an idea that undoubtedly warrants further investigation.
Whether referred to as a processing "cost" or a processing "consequence, " we believe what is relevant in considering such ideas is that the brain may need to engage in some form of "extra" processing when, on the basis of constraintbased predictive comprehension, an accruing contextual representation must be overridden, revised, inhibited, or reanalyzed -at least, if not only, in cases where there is a strong lexical candidate that does not materialize. "Cost" also might not be the most apt term if an unexpected item triggers updating in a learning signal, where probability likelihoods are being adjusted for the future. Such learning might be considered a "cost" in the short term, but in the longer term, the comprehender would benefi t by gaining an accurate model of their linguistic environment.
Our interpretation of a "misprediction consequence" is compatible with theories suggesting that such eff ects may be best accounted for in terms of cognitive control and confl ict monitoring. Kolk and colleagues (Kolk, Chwilla, van Herten, & Oor, 2003 ; van Herten et al., 2006 ; Vissers, Kolk, van de Meerendonk, & Chwilla, 2008 ) , for instance, have suggested that when confl icts emerge between incompatible sentential representations, reanalysis is initiated to check whether the confl ict is due to processing error. Novick, Trueswell, and Th ompson-Schill ( 2005 ) and Th ompson-Schill ( 2005 ) suggest that such reanalysis might stem from the selection among competing representations based on task demands. Although none of these authors frame a hypothesis specifi cally in terms of pre-activation or prediction violation, we believe that our results, and others, are compatible with this proposal. Moreover, we propose that the relevant "confl icts" need not be ones of syntactic or even semantic violation, arising even when items or their features are pre-activated to varying degrees, and then disconfi rmed by the actual (physical) input. Th is more domain-general proposal is also consistent with the view that the cognitive control mechanisms involved in sentence comprehension may be similar to those employed in more general confl ict tasks like the Stroop task (e.g., Novick et al., 2005 ; Th ompsonSchill, 2005 ; Ye & Zhou, 2008 ) . In addition, the observation of the generally more frontal scalp distribution of Federmeier et al. 's and DeLong et al. 's LP eff ect is roughly consistent with imaging data implicating various frontal and prefrontal cortical areas in inhibition (e.g., Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004 ) , error detection (e.g., Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 2003 ) , and suppression of interfering memories (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004 ) . While ERP patterns at the scalp do not allow for direct mappings to specifi c brain areas, these distributional similarities are nonetheless suggestive.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have off ered some evidence for implicit, probabilistic anticipatory language processing, which we have argued may be cost incurring when continuations are highly anticipated but not received. Th ese fi ndings stand in contrast to a more classical view of language comprehension, and brain processing in general, as being essentially bottom up, waiting for sensory input that is processed and eventually recruited for action. Th e research reviewed herein is more compatible with the new wave of neural models proposing that a unifying principle for brain operation is one of being more "proactive, " "prospective, " or "pre-experiencing" (Bar, 2007 ; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007 ; & Buckner, 2007 ; ) . Under active brain accounts like these, neural processors are assumed to constantly be predicting upcoming input and monitoring the consistency of the anticipated and actual outcomes. Th is default mode of operation is proposed to occur across all domains, at sensory, motor, and cognitive levels. With respect to a more cognitive domain, have proposed that a crucial function of memory is to make information available for simulating future events. Under this model, it is unclear what the exact role of a semantic component is in constructing future scenarios; however, it seems that prediction in language processing fi ts nicely with models of predicting upcoming language input based on our stored mental representations in combination with contextual factors. And co-opting another idea from vision research (Enns & Lleras, 2008 ) , it seems possible that some recent fi ndings indicating a "cost" for pre-activation may be compatible with the idea of processing information that is inconsistent with some prevailing, pre-activated schema or expectation; in turn, the information triggering such discrepancies may ultimately be processed relatively slowly because the parser must start over restructuring a new contextual representation. Th ese few examples highlight our belief that as we "look ahead" to continued exploration of prediction issues in the language domain, it will also be benefi cial to "look around" and let our research be informed, shaped, and spurred by examinations within a larger framework of general brain processing, incorporating proposals of prediction from theories of human motor control (so-called forward models), from a variety of aspects of vision research, from judgment and decision making, and from episodic and semantic memory studies; indeed, scientists within these various domains are already doing just this! Without denying the uniqueness and seeming specialization of the human brain for comprehending and producing language, it seems that the door has been cracked wider for investigations of how predictive linguistic processing might better be understood in terms of how the brain more generally predicts. We maintain that the studies we have described here have served to tip the scale, such that anticipatory processing should no longer be considered a lingering question in the literature, but rather should be understood as a natural part of the way language is comprehended, with future investigations targeting the nature and consequences of linguistic preactivation.
